A "Digital View" of Afghanistan
by Frederic A. Moritz
Former Asia Correspondent
The Christian Science Monitor
British defeat Afghans, 1880
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"The effort in Afghanistan is going to be the
longest campaign of the long war"
Centcom Commander, Oct. 2008
U.S. Marines, Helmand Province, 2009
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The Battle in Washington Will Dominate:
a "hybrid" policy in the wings?
"The object of continuous assessment is to identify
where and how the design is working or failing
and to consider adjustment to the
design and operation"
-- The U.S. Army Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 4-14
"In every war there are hopes for peace.
In every peace there are seeds of future wars.
So it has always been.
So it will always be...."
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Those who are familiar with the political philosophy of Doris Day may have "a leg up" in predicting future outcomes in Afghanistan.
It's the kind of insight you can get when you take a "digital view."
It's the kind of insight you can get when you take a "digital view."
As Doris recently recalled:
"By 1880 massive British military power, including the rapidly loading Martini-Henry rifle, had vanguished Pashtun tribes sufficiently to pave the way for British withdrawal.
"A settlement with Afghan chieftains protected Britain from Russian inroads in Afghanistan.
"In return the British refrained from further efforts to occupy, dominate, and restructure Afghanistan.
"The more pacifist government of William Gladstone elected in 1880 had rejected the forward strategy of the defeated Benjamin Disraeli."
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The British succeeded in 1880.
There was quiet for decades in Afghanistan.
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Can the U.S. achieve its goals in Afghanistan without overreaching, draining its economy, bogging itself down in a kind of perpetual warfare?
Without dumping billions into an effort to restructure a tribal society into a modern nation.
Without provoking an anti-foreign nationalist resentment which brings fresh recruits to the Taliban.
Without going down to a humiliating defeat as did Soviet occupiers in the 1980's.
It will be a lot more complicated than it was for Britain in 1880.
All of this will have to be thought through, carefully planned.
Otherwise a troop "surge" can backfire.
These concerns have been eloquently expressed by Sen. Jim Webb, (D-Va.).
They are concerns I have raised in an earlier blog calling for opposition to a "surge."
One great danger is that the American military will be put in an impossible position: unreachable goals with limited resources.
As one veteran puts it, "to be set up again for defeat as we were in Vietnam because no sitting President wants to be seen as losing."
One great danger is that the American military will be put in an impossible position: unreachable goals with limited resources.
As one veteran puts it, "to be set up again for defeat as we were in Vietnam because no sitting President wants to be seen as losing."
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War, it has often been said, is the greatest gamble of all.
It is time, once again, to roll the Afghan dice.
Jack of Diamonds: "I bet you I beat you next game"
Check the cost of the gamble at iCasualties.org
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In the words of Doris Day, "Whatever will be will be."
Let us be hopeful, but not deluded.
Aware that in war there are few certainties, successes, but many pitfalls.
An ambitious strategy to achieve "victory" will reguire lots of blood and treasure.
So will a less ambitious strategy to avoid defeat.
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What do Afghans themselves want?
Difficult to generalize, but for some suggestions see Los Angeles Times article, September 31,2009.
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PBS Video: a graphic portrait
of "new" U.S. "seize and hold" tactics.
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The troop intensive "seize and hold" strategy seeks to get in close to the civilian population.
It would aid in local administration and development -- while providing continued local protection against Taliban retaliation.
Confidence that U.S. forces would stay around would in theory encourage villager loyalty and overall stability.
A "hybrid" approach, summarized below by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, might clear and hold certain strategic Pashtun parts of the country but leave large areas unoccupied.
The secured areas could be used as a base for pinpointed, anti-terrorist strikes on Al Qaeda targets in other parts of the country.
The present policy appears to be such a "hybrid" approach:" -- clear and hold in about ten percent of the country -- with anti-terrorist strikes on the rest.
Here is how Kissinger describes this approach, citing the thinking of Centcom commander General David Petraeus:
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"Heretofore, America has pursued traditional anti-insurgency tactics: to create a central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society.
"That strategy cannot succeed in Afghanistan... The country is too large, the territory too forbidding, the ethnic composition too varied, the population too heavily armed. No foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in occupying Afghanistan. Even attempts to establish centralized Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for long....
"Military strategy should concentrate on preventing the emergence of a coherent, contiguous state within the state controlled by jihadists. In practice, this would mean control of Kabul and the Pashtun area.....
"Gen. David Petraeus has argued that, reinforced by the number of American forces he has recommended, he should be able to control the 10 percent of Afghan territory where, in his words, 80 percent of the military threat originates. This is the region where the 'clear, hold and build' strategy that had success in Iraq is particularly applicable."
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A problem with this approach is that it could "stir up a hornets nest."
The Pashtun part of the country is where bloody anti-American resistance can be expected -- especially if American clear and hold tactics provoke an upsurge of historic Pashtun anti-foreign nationalism.
The Pashtun tribes occupy the rugged border areas of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Subduing them could be a rough and costly job.
This strategy may require large surges of American troops.
The conflict could escalate over the border into Pakistan with unpredictable impact on that nation's stability.
If the U.S. maintains or increases its presence in Afghanistan, it will most likely need to refrain from efforts to build up a strong central government and military.
The Karzai government may become increasingly irrelevant.
Instead the U.S. would need a dual approach of accepting tribal independence in areas it does not "clear and hold" -- while working closely with tribal traditions of decentralized administration in those areas which U.S. troops hold sway.
The more of this working at the local level the U.S. does, the more costly will be the mission.
Writes the author of In the Graveyard of Empires, Rand Corporation political scientist Seth G. Jones:
"Masses of rural Afghans today still reject a strong central government actively meddling in their affairs. In southern and eastern Afghanistan, which are dominated by Pashtuns, many consider the central government a foreign entity. 'My allegiance is to my family first,' one tribal elder from Kandahar told me earlier this year. 'Then to my village, sub-tribe, and tribe,' he continued, noting that the government played no meaningful role in his daily life.....
"I have often been struck by the disconnect between the center and periphery when traveling through areas where, as recently as this year, some villagers had never heard of President Hamid Karzai, who has led the country since 2001. In a few cases, they even thought U.S. military forces I was traveling with were Soviets, not realizing that the Soviet army withdrew in 1989. Time has a way of standing still in rural Afghanistan."
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Still another approach under discussion would rely on strikes against Al Qaeda from outside of the country -- thus reducing any need for a surge of American troops within Afghanistan.
This is the strategy favored by Vice President Joseph Biden.
Some label this a "strategy of containment."
The President may have to accept a humiliating and brutal return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan if he orders a gradual retreat to an "offshore strategy."
Al Qaeda and the Taliban could claim victory over the world's greatest superpower.
That would be politically costly to President Obama. It could also energize Islamic extremist or separatist groups in Pakistan, India, Russia, and China.
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From Pakistan to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass:
the poetry of Rudyard Kipling
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Finally there may be a host of variations on these options which require differing degrees of clear and hold, varying troop levels, varying amounts of civilian reconstruction, varying degrees of manpower intensive "nation-building."
The smaller the occupying "footprint" of the American military the less likely is a vast nationalistic anti-foreign Afghan backlash.
But how big a "footprint" necessary to prevent a Taliban comeback and the remergence of an Al Qaeda stronghold?
All this is now under discussion in Washington.
We can be sure that the more ambitious the mission set by President Obama, the more troops and resources in the form of a "surge" the military will seek.
If the President is unwilling to step up the resources, he will be forced to scale down the mission -- either formally or in some hidden, politically advantageous way.
Lastly, even a scaled down mission may require a carefully tailored "surge" given the military advances the Taliban has scored.
For a thoughtful discussion of a wide range of these options see the article by political scientist Howard Schweber of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
For a powerful critique of Obama's Afghanistan policies see the article by Graham E. Fuller, a former Kabul station chief for the C.I.A.
He points out ways must be found to decrease the American "footprint," to internationalize reconstruction, to open the way ultimately for an American withdrawal as a dominant occupying power.
For that "footprint" is likely to stimulate Pashtun nationalism -- which threatens to destabilize both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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The Battle in Washington Will Dominate:
a "hybrid" policy in the wings?
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The Washington political battlefield will be at least as important as anything happening "on the ground" in Afghanistan.
Of most immediate importance is the late August pessimistic assessment by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.
That assessment carries with it a separate request for up to 40,000 additional troops to bolster a counter-insurgency "clear and hold" approach.
The U.S. commander concluded the war could be lost within a year unless there are major American reinforcements. It added that even with the reinforcements victory could not be assured.
Check an extensive interview with Gen McChrystal carried out by PBS Frontline, airing October 13.
This interview gives insights on how Gen McChrystal was "tasked" by President Obama during an early meeting after his appointment in May 2009.
It also gives insights on how and where Gen McChrystal concludes "search and hold" might be most useful.
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Any changed policy is likely to be a "hybrid" compromise of different approaches blended by the President after vigorous discussion and political infighting.
It will seek to build domestic public support by minimizing American casualties and by preventing an early Taliban takeover which might embarrass the President.
Obama will have to protect his flanks from both the "Left" pushing for rapid withdrawal and the "Right" lobbying for "victory."
The President will be get plenty of advice from advocates of staying deep in Afghanistan.
The more agressively interventionist, anti-insurgency approach of Centcom chief General David Petraeus will strengthen the hand of the powerful "Clinton faction."
This consists of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her ally, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke.
Gen. Petraeus is a chief architect of the U.S. military's current thinking on anti-insurgency warfare, as explained in a U.S. Army Field Manual on counter-insurgency campaigns.
His counter-insurgency approach as used in Iraq would seem to require vast increases in American troops in Afghanistan.
It should not be assumed that generals McChrystal and Petraeus favor "clear and hold" for the entire Afghan nation.
While their emphasis tends toward counter-insurgency and nation-building, their strategy might be made compatible with a more limited "clear and hold" approach focusing on smaller sections of the country.
That might require a smaller "surge. "
Petraeus enjoys enormous prestige, especially among conservatives, for his success in putting down the Iraq insurgency.
Obama will be vulnerable to conservative attack if he appears to break with Petraeus. He will be accused of disregarding the military advice of his most brilliant commander.
That would open the President to blame for any future military reverses.
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The New York Times has reported that Gen. Petraeus is apparently exercising caution lest he be accused of trying to dictate policy to President Obama.
The general is more distant from President Obama than he was from President Bush -- and has been less outspoken in public than he was under President Bush.
He is a significant player -- only one of several. The general is now more cautious both in public speeches and with Congress .
Despite speculation that Gen. Petraeus might wish to run for president, the general has so far refrained from staking out a visible stance against President Obama's military deliberations.
It is clear Gen. Petraeus seeks to avoid any comparisons to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who was fired as commander of U.S. forces in Korea in 1951.
Gen. MacArthur had openly defied President Harry Truman on Korean War policy by favoring an attack on China.
Like Gen. Petraeus, Gen. MacArthur was the "darling" of the then president's Republican opposition.
It is clear Gen. Petraeus seeks to quash any notion he is using his military position to run for president.
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The Clinton faction pushes toward agressive American control and reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Holbrooke is known as a tough, aggressive, arrogant, but warmhearted political infighter who tends to dominate those around him.
Vice President Biden's off-shore containment strategy, plus Defense Secretary Robert Gate's cautious approach, may give President Obama some wiggle room.
On Secretary Gates' evolving approach see Wall Street Journal article, September 31, 2009.
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As part of a shift to a counter-insurgency strategy, American commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal is reported to be pushing a withdrawal of American forces from vulnerable remote outposts to more accessible population centers where they would protect and hold.
Eight American soldiers died the weekend of October 3 defending the Kadesh outpost in remore Nuristan, not far from Wanant where nine American soldiers died in a similar attack in July 2008.
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One model for American success, however limited, is the British campaign of 1878 to 1880.
Eight American soldiers died the weekend of October 3 defending the Kadesh outpost in remore Nuristan, not far from Wanant where nine American soldiers died in a similar attack in July 2008.
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One model for American success, however limited, is the British campaign of 1878 to 1880.
It will be much harder for the U.S. to extract itself from Afghanistan than it was for the British.
Britain could strike deals with Afghan emirs to keep the Russians out.
It is doubtful the U.S. could ever come to a comprehensive deal with the Taliban to keep Al Qaeda out.
There will be relatively few U.S. casualties if the U.S. stays on the ground in Afghanistan. Many more Afghans will die.
But the larger the mission, the faster the American toll will rise.
Only a little over 800 American soldiers have died in Afghanistan since 2001.
Little consolation to many war weary Americans who have seen more than 5,000 of their troops die in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.
Will they really care if a Taliban victory again imposes medieval barbarity on Afghanistan?
With far more Afghan civilian victims than ever killed by American bombs.
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If a "surge" is mismanaged, it could create new problems of expanded war and instability affecting Pakistan, India, Russia, and China.
A stepped up, longer term American presence in Afghanistan will impact the U.S. confrontation with Iran.
Teheran would then be surrounded by a ring of American bases on its west in Iraq and on its east in Afghanistan.
That is a strategic equation of encirclement likely to reinforce the Iranian desire for nuclear weapons.
On the other hand the Iranian regime has long been at odds with the Taliban. It shares with the U.S. a goal to keep the Taliban out of power.
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A bottom line:
Those who look back obsessed with and fearing a repeat of the Vietnam War can turn into a "pillar of salt."
Those who plunge ahead too fast without considering the consequences can sink into a deadly swamp.
Those who plunge ahead too fast without considering the consequences can sink into a deadly swamp.
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The best laid plans can go astray in the chaos of mountain passes and the screaming cliches of American politics and sensational mass media.
Even as this nation disingenuously seeks to convince itself it is not some outside power intervening in -- bogged down in -- what has been called "the graveyard of empires."
Afghanistan need not be the graveyard of the American Empire.
But "success" will most likely be both expensive and limited.
We can reasonably be sure that out of it will come in one way or another still more war.
"In every war there are hopes for peace.
In every peace there are seeds of future wars.
"So it has always been.
So it will always be...."
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Let a "surge" go forward -- if carefully tailored to meet the realities and pitfalls of Afghanistan.
