From an old imperialist: a warning on Afghanistan

From the shadows of costly colonial battles:
Rudyard Kipling on the "savage wars of peace"
A Master Storyteller "rings a bell" of caution

What has been, that will be;

what has been done, that will be done.

Nothing is new under the sun.

Even the thing of which we say, "See, this is new!"

has already existed in the ages that preceded us.

Ecclesiastes 1:9,10

Rudyard Kipling: His Poetry
Rudyard Kipling: Biography
Rudyard Kipling: The White Man's Burden, 1899

Rudyard Kipling: Ford O' Kabul River, Second Afghan War
Rudyard Kipling: Arithmetic of the Frontier, 1886
Rudyard Kipling: The Man Who Would Be King, 1888
(A short story on imperialism, set partly in Afghanistan, based on Josiah Harlan)
Josiah Harlan, the American Quaker who would be Afghan king, 1838

Frederic A. Moritz: More Troops to Afghanistan?

Frederic A. Moritz: Pick off an Occupying Army; an Old Story

Frederic A. Moritz: Will Obama Follow the Advice of Lord Roberts?

Disastrous British retreat to Gandamuk, First Afghan War, 1842

Victorious British March to Kandahar, Second Afghan War, 1880
Martini-Henry, the rifle which won the Second Afghan War

Edward Girardet, The Great Pretend Game

David Rohde, "Held by the Taliban," NYT, Oct. 17, 2009

(Video on growing anti-Americanism)

To PRESIDENT BARAK OBAMA -- GREETINGS, my son!

But first, Mr. President, at the suggestion of my friend Frederic A. Moritz, may I include these words:

"Be Wise and Careful, for what benefit a man if he drown in the same river as those who came before."

And now, Mr. President, below may I commend to you a favorite poem I have penned: "Ford 'Ol Kabul River."

I have chosen each word carefully, for those such as yourself.

***************

KIPLING'S ALLEGORY FOR BRITAIN'S

"GETTING IN OVER ITS HEAD"

Ford O' Kabul River. 1879

(River disaster of the 10th Hussars: 46 drowned)

Kabul town's by Kabul river --
Blow the bugle, draw the sword --
There I lef' my mate for ever,
Wet an' drippin' by the ford.
Ford, ford, ford o' Kabul river,
Ford o' Kabul river in the dark!
There's the river up and brimmin', an' there's 'arf a squadron swimmin'
'Cross the ford o' Kabul river in the dark....

Kabul town'll go to hell --
Blow the bugle, draw the sword --
'Fore I see him 'live an' well --
'Im the best beside the ford.
Ford, ford, ford o' Kabul river,
Ford o' Kabul river in the dark!
Gawd 'elp 'em if they blunder, for their boots'll pull 'em under,
By the ford o' Kabul river in the dark.

***************

KIPLING ON "ASSYMETRIC WARFARE"

Arithmetic of the Frontier, 1886
(on the Second Afghan War)

...A scrimmage in a Border Station—
A canter down some dark defile—
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail—
The Crammer's boast, the Squadron's pride,
Shot like a rabbit in a ride!

No proposition Euclid wrote,
No formulae the text-books know,
Will turn the bullet from your coat,
Or ward the tulwar's downward blow
Strike hard who cares—shoot straight who can—
The odds are on the cheaper man.

One sword-knot stolen from the camp
Will pay for all the school expenses
Of any Kurrum Valley scamp
Who knows no word of moods and tenses,
But, being blessed with perfect sight,
Picks off our messmates left and right.

With home-bred hordes the hillsides teem,
The troop-ships bring us one by one,
At vast expense of time and steam,
To slay Afridis where they run.
The "captives of our bow and spear"
Are cheap—alas! as we are dear.

***************

From The Naulahka:

"Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan brown.

"For the Christian riles, and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the Christian down;

"And the end of the fight is a tombkstone white with the name of the late deceased.

"And the epitaph drear: 'A Fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.'"

***************
So MR. PRESIDENT -- If onward you must go:

"Take up the White Man's burden--
The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine,
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
(The end for others sought)
Watch sloth and heathen folly
Bring all your hope to nought."

***************
And MR. PRESIDENT:

"If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you;
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
But make allowance for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or being lied about, don't deal in lies,
Or being hated, don't give way to hating,
And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise:

"If you can dream -- and not make dreams your master;
If you can think -- and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two imposters just the same;
If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools;

"If you can make one heap of all your winnings
And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,
And lose, and start again at your beginnings
And never breathe a word about your loss;
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the Will which says to them: 'Hold on!'

"If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
Or walk with kings -- nor lose the common touch,
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds' worth of distance run --
Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it,
And -- which is more -- you'll be a Man, my son."

***************

Britain won the Second Afghan war, but at great cost.

See a representation of Rudyard Kipling in this

video of "The Man Who Would Be King,"

a tragic allegory for Britain's involvement

in Afghanistan

Joshua Harlan, American "Quaker" --

the real "man who would be king"

***************

Images of Afghan resistance to

British incursions, 1839 to 1919

Following Alexander the Great to Afghanistan

************

************

These BBC segments speak for themselves.

1) Follow Alexander to Kabul and explore what he left behind.

2) Follow Alexander's military campaigns up across the Hindu Kush mountains

Here is a general account of the life of Alexander the Great. Here is a more specific account of his exploits in Afghanistan.

"After Alexander’s death, Afghanistan is divided amongst four Greek governors with their capitals being Kabul and its suburbs, Heart and Sistaan, Qandahar and Baluchistan, and Bakhter (balkh area) and ruled for the next 55 years. By 250 BC the Governors of these four regions declared their independence and established a new Greek-Bakhter government independent of mainland Greece. Roxanne pregnant with Alexander's son moves back to Macedonia. After giving birth to the heir of Alexander's kingdom, both Roxanne and Alexander IV are killed by insurgents."

Should Prez Obama take advice from a Russian?

Russian commentator urges US co-operation
with Russia to stabilize Afghanistan

*****

Russian military analyst: US could "win"
because of China and Russia
-- but at tremendous economic cost

********

How many times have "we" been warned about the dangers of repeating the mistakes the Soviet Union made in its diasastrous 1980's occupation of Afghanistan?

One Russian military analyst, not the one featured above, tells us the Soviet strategy might today work for the United States -- but at tremendous economic cost.

The Soviet Union, he reminds us, was opposed by both the United States and China.

Today, he maintains, neither China nor Russia are opposing the United States.

The United States, unlike the Soviet Union in the 1980's, has the co-operation of Pakistan.

Still, he cautions, any effort to transform Afghanistan into a Central Asian Valhalla could take a decade and cost far beyond what any nation is likely to afford.

This broadcast was made in February 2009, when President Obama had just beefed up troop strength in Afghanistan.

**********

Doris Day looks at "hybrid" Afghan choices ahead...

A "Digital View" of Afghanistan

by Frederic A. Moritz

Former Asia Correspondent

The Christian Science Monitor

British defeat Afghans, 1880

**********

"The effort in Afghanistan is going to be the

longest campaign of the long war"

General David H. Petraeus

Centcom Commander, Oct. 2008

U.S. Marines, Helmand Province, 2009

**********

The Battle in Washington Will Dominate:

a "hybrid" policy in the wings?

"The object of continuous assessment is to identify

where and how the design is working or failing

and to consider adjustment to the

design and operation"

-- The U.S. Army Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 4-14

"In every war there are hopes for peace.

In every peace there are seeds of future wars.

So it has always been.

So it will always be...."

**********

**********

Those who are familiar with the political philosophy of Doris Day may have "a leg up" in predicting future outcomes in Afghanistan.

It's the kind of insight you can get when you take a "digital view."

As Doris recently recalled:

"By 1880 massive British military power, including the rapidly loading Martini-Henry rifle, had vanguished Pashtun tribes sufficiently to pave the way for British withdrawal.

"A settlement with Afghan chieftains protected Britain from Russian inroads in Afghanistan.

"In return the British refrained from further efforts to occupy, dominate, and restructure Afghanistan.

"The more pacifist government of William Gladstone elected in 1880 had rejected the forward strategy of the defeated Benjamin Disraeli."

**********

The British succeeded in 1880.

There was quiet for decades in Afghanistan.

**********

Can the U.S. achieve its goals in Afghanistan without overreaching, draining its economy, bogging itself down in a kind of perpetual warfare?

Without dumping billions into an effort to restructure a tribal society into a modern nation.

Without provoking an anti-foreign nationalist resentment which brings fresh recruits to the Taliban.

Without going down to a humiliating defeat as did Soviet occupiers in the 1980's.

It will be a lot more complicated than it was for Britain in 1880.

All of this will have to be thought through, carefully planned.

Otherwise a troop "surge" can backfire.

These concerns have been eloquently expressed by Sen. Jim Webb, (D-Va.).

They are concerns I have raised in an earlier blog calling for opposition to a "surge."

One great danger is that the American military will be put in an impossible position: unreachable goals with limited resources.

As one veteran puts it, "to be set up again for defeat as we were in Vietnam because no sitting President wants to be seen as losing."

**********

War, it has often been said, is the greatest gamble of all.

It is time, once again, to roll the Afghan dice.

Jack of Diamonds: "I bet you I beat you next game"

Check the cost of the gamble at iCasualties.org

**********

In the words of Doris Day, "Whatever will be will be."

Let us be hopeful, but not deluded.

Aware that in war there are few certainties, successes, but many pitfalls.

An ambitious strategy to achieve "victory" will reguire lots of blood and treasure.

So will a less ambitious strategy to avoid defeat.

In Rudyard Kipling's words: these are the "savage wars of peace."

**********

What do Afghans themselves want?

Difficult to generalize, but for some suggestions see Los Angeles Times article, September 31,2009.

**********

PBS Video: a graphic portrait

of "new" U.S. "seize and hold" tactics.

View the entire video.

**********

The troop intensive "seize and hold" strategy seeks to get in close to the civilian population.

It would aid in local administration and development -- while providing continued local protection against Taliban retaliation.

Confidence that U.S. forces would stay around would in theory encourage villager loyalty and overall stability.

A "hybrid" approach, summarized below by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, might clear and hold certain strategic Pashtun parts of the country but leave large areas unoccupied.

The secured areas could be used as a base for pinpointed, anti-terrorist strikes on Al Qaeda targets in other parts of the country.

The present policy appears to be such a "hybrid" approach:" -- clear and hold in about ten percent of the country -- with anti-terrorist strikes on the rest.

Here is how Kissinger describes this approach, citing the thinking of Centcom commander General David Petraeus:

**********

"Heretofore, America has pursued traditional anti-insurgency tactics: to create a central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern bureaucratic and democratic society.

"That strategy cannot succeed in Afghanistan... The country is too large, the territory too forbidding, the ethnic composition too varied, the population too heavily armed. No foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in occupying Afghanistan. Even attempts to establish centralized Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for long....

"Military strategy should concentrate on preventing the emergence of a coherent, contiguous state within the state controlled by jihadists. In practice, this would mean control of Kabul and the Pashtun area.....

"Gen. David Petraeus has argued that, reinforced by the number of American forces he has recommended, he should be able to control the 10 percent of Afghan territory where, in his words, 80 percent of the military threat originates. This is the region where the 'clear, hold and build' strategy that had success in Iraq is particularly applicable."

**********

**********

A problem with this approach is that it could "stir up a hornets nest."

The Pashtun part of the country is where bloody anti-American resistance can be expected -- especially if American clear and hold tactics provoke an upsurge of historic Pashtun anti-foreign nationalism.

The Pashtun tribes occupy the rugged border areas of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Subduing them could be a rough and costly job.

This strategy may require large surges of American troops.

The conflict could escalate over the border into Pakistan with unpredictable impact on that nation's stability.

If the U.S. maintains or increases its presence in Afghanistan, it will most likely need to refrain from efforts to build up a strong central government and military.

The Karzai government may become increasingly irrelevant.

Instead the U.S. would need a dual approach of accepting tribal independence in areas it does not "clear and hold" -- while working closely with tribal traditions of decentralized administration in those areas which U.S. troops hold sway.

The more of this working at the local level the U.S. does, the more costly will be the mission.

Writes the author of In the Graveyard of Empires, Rand Corporation political scientist Seth G. Jones:

"Masses of rural Afghans today still reject a strong central government actively meddling in their affairs. In southern and eastern Afghanistan, which are dominated by Pashtuns, many consider the central government a foreign entity. 'My allegiance is to my family first,' one tribal elder from Kandahar told me earlier this year. 'Then to my village, sub-tribe, and tribe,' he continued, noting that the government played no meaningful role in his daily life.....

"I have often been struck by the disconnect between the center and periphery when traveling through areas where, as recently as this year, some villagers had never heard of President Hamid Karzai, who has led the country since 2001. In a few cases, they even thought U.S. military forces I was traveling with were Soviets, not realizing that the Soviet army withdrew in 1989. Time has a way of standing still in rural Afghanistan."

**********

Still another approach under discussion would rely on strikes against Al Qaeda from outside of the country -- thus reducing any need for a surge of American troops within Afghanistan.

This is the strategy favored by Vice President Joseph Biden.

Some label this a "strategy of containment."

The President may have to accept a humiliating and brutal return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan if he orders a gradual retreat to an "offshore strategy."

Al Qaeda and the Taliban could claim victory over the world's greatest superpower.

That would be politically costly to President Obama. It could also energize Islamic extremist or separatist groups in Pakistan, India, Russia, and China.

**********

From Pakistan to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass:

Another video of the Khyber Pass featuring

the poetry of Rudyard Kipling

**********

Finally there may be a host of variations on these options which require differing degrees of clear and hold, varying troop levels, varying amounts of civilian reconstruction, varying degrees of manpower intensive "nation-building."

The smaller the occupying "footprint" of the American military the less likely is a vast nationalistic anti-foreign Afghan backlash.

But how big a "footprint" necessary to prevent a Taliban comeback and the remergence of an Al Qaeda stronghold?

All this is now under discussion in Washington.

We can be sure that the more ambitious the mission set by President Obama, the more troops and resources in the form of a "surge" the military will seek.

If the President is unwilling to step up the resources, he will be forced to scale down the mission -- either formally or in some hidden, politically advantageous way.

Lastly, even a scaled down mission may require a carefully tailored "surge" given the military advances the Taliban has scored.

For a thoughtful discussion of a wide range of these options see the article by political scientist Howard Schweber of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

For a powerful critique of Obama's Afghanistan policies see the article by Graham E. Fuller, a former Kabul station chief for the C.I.A.

He points out ways must be found to decrease the American "footprint," to internationalize reconstruction, to open the way ultimately for an American withdrawal as a dominant occupying power.

For that "footprint" is likely to stimulate Pashtun nationalism -- which threatens to destabilize both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**********

The Battle in Washington Will Dominate:

a "hybrid" policy in the wings?

**********

The Washington political battlefield will be at least as important as anything happening "on the ground" in Afghanistan.

Of most immediate importance is the late August pessimistic assessment by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

That assessment carries with it a separate request for up to 40,000 additional troops to bolster a counter-insurgency "clear and hold" approach.

The U.S. commander concluded the war could be lost within a year unless there are major American reinforcements. It added that even with the reinforcements victory could not be assured.

Check an extensive interview with Gen McChrystal carried out by PBS Frontline, airing October 13.

This interview gives insights on how Gen McChrystal was "tasked" by President Obama during an early meeting after his appointment in May 2009.

It also gives insights on how and where Gen McChrystal concludes "search and hold" might be most useful.

**********

Any changed policy is likely to be a "hybrid" compromise of different approaches blended by the President after vigorous discussion and political infighting.

It will seek to build domestic public support by minimizing American casualties and by preventing an early Taliban takeover which might embarrass the President.

Obama will have to protect his flanks from both the "Left" pushing for rapid withdrawal and the "Right" lobbying for "victory."

The President will be get plenty of advice from advocates of staying deep in Afghanistan.

The more agressively interventionist, anti-insurgency approach of Centcom chief General David Petraeus will strengthen the hand of the powerful "Clinton faction."

This consists of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her ally, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke.

Gen. Petraeus is a chief architect of the U.S. military's current thinking on anti-insurgency warfare, as explained in a U.S. Army Field Manual on counter-insurgency campaigns.

His counter-insurgency approach as used in Iraq would seem to require vast increases in American troops in Afghanistan.

It should not be assumed that generals McChrystal and Petraeus favor "clear and hold" for the entire Afghan nation.

While their emphasis tends toward counter-insurgency and nation-building, their strategy might be made compatible with a more limited "clear and hold" approach focusing on smaller sections of the country.

That might require a smaller "surge. "

Petraeus enjoys enormous prestige, especially among conservatives, for his success in putting down the Iraq insurgency.

Obama will be vulnerable to conservative attack if he appears to break with Petraeus. He will be accused of disregarding the military advice of his most brilliant commander.

That would open the President to blame for any future military reverses.

*******

The New York Times has reported that Gen. Petraeus is apparently exercising caution lest he be accused of trying to dictate policy to President Obama.

The general is more distant from President Obama than he was from President Bush -- and has been less outspoken in public than he was under President Bush.

He is a significant player -- only one of several. The general is now more cautious both in public speeches and with Congress .

Despite speculation that Gen. Petraeus might wish to run for president, the general has so far refrained from staking out a visible stance against President Obama's military deliberations.

It is clear Gen. Petraeus seeks to avoid any comparisons to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who was fired as commander of U.S. forces in Korea in 1951.

Gen. MacArthur had openly defied President Harry Truman on Korean War policy by favoring an attack on China.

Like Gen. Petraeus, Gen. MacArthur was the "darling" of the then president's Republican opposition.

It is clear Gen. Petraeus seeks to quash any notion he is using his military position to run for president.

*******

The Clinton faction pushes toward agressive American control and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Ambassador Holbrooke is known as a tough, aggressive, arrogant, but warmhearted political infighter who tends to dominate those around him.

Vice President Biden's off-shore containment strategy, plus Defense Secretary Robert Gate's cautious approach, may give President Obama some wiggle room.

On Secretary Gates' evolving approach see Wall Street Journal article, September 31, 2009.

**********

As part of a shift to a counter-insurgency strategy, American commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal is reported to be pushing a withdrawal of American forces from vulnerable remote outposts to more accessible population centers where they would protect and hold.

Eight American soldiers died the weekend of October 3 defending the Kadesh outpost in remore Nuristan, not far from Wanant where nine American soldiers died in a similar attack in July 2008.

**************

**************

One model for American success, however limited, is the British campaign of 1878 to 1880.

It will be much harder for the U.S. to extract itself from Afghanistan than it was for the British.

Britain could strike deals with Afghan emirs to keep the Russians out.

It is doubtful the U.S. could ever come to a comprehensive deal with the Taliban to keep Al Qaeda out.

There will be relatively few U.S. casualties if the U.S. stays on the ground in Afghanistan. Many more Afghans will die.

But the larger the mission, the faster the American toll will rise.

Only a little over 800 American soldiers have died in Afghanistan since 2001.

Little consolation to many war weary Americans who have seen more than 5,000 of their troops die in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.

Will they really care if a Taliban victory again imposes medieval barbarity on Afghanistan?

With far more Afghan civilian victims than ever killed by American bombs.

**********

If a "surge" is mismanaged, it could create new problems of expanded war and instability affecting Pakistan, India, Russia, and China.

A stepped up, longer term American presence in Afghanistan will impact the U.S. confrontation with Iran.

Teheran would then be surrounded by a ring of American bases on its west in Iraq and on its east in Afghanistan.

That is a strategic equation of encirclement likely to reinforce the Iranian desire for nuclear weapons.

On the other hand the Iranian regime has long been at odds with the Taliban. It shares with the U.S. a goal to keep the Taliban out of power.

**********

A bottom line:

Those who look back obsessed with and fearing a repeat of the Vietnam War can turn into a "pillar of salt."

Those who plunge ahead too fast without considering the consequences can sink into a deadly swamp.

*********

The best laid plans can go astray in the chaos of mountain passes and the screaming cliches of American politics and sensational mass media.

Even as this nation disingenuously seeks to convince itself it is not some outside power intervening in -- bogged down in -- what has been called "the graveyard of empires."

Afghanistan need not be the graveyard of the American Empire.

But "success" will most likely be both expensive and limited.

We can reasonably be sure that out of it will come in one way or another still more war.

"In every war there are hopes for peace.

In every peace there are seeds of future wars.

"So it has always been.

So it will always be...."

******

Let a "surge" go forward -- if carefully tailored to meet the realities and pitfalls of Afghanistan.